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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

US NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY: KEEPING THE CONFUSION FROM BECOMING DISORGANIZED

BY

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ABSTRACT

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A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, quarantees immutable protection for our citizens, sovereignty, values, and the long term well-being of the nation. All are vital, nation-sustaining interests. We look to our leaders, diplomats, and generals to make good on these Constitutional quarantees. But buried deep in each hydrogen molecule are atoms of raw energy and the building materials of world-busting weapons. Nuclear weapons are an evil reality and one of only a handful of threats to our Democracy. We must pay attention to the currents of international nuclear mercantilism. Fissile materials proliferate for profit. Some of our "friends" sell and our enemies want to buy, for all the wrong reasons. Nuclear proliferation puts our vital interests at-risk as they never have been before. So the U.S. must craft security policies that slow or stop proliferation. This study will address nuclear nonproliferation policies by analyzing theory on strategy in the nuclear age, describe the current nuclear landscape, and define U.S. nonproliferation policies and their effectiveness. conclusion being that the U.S. must refine its policies before rogue nations Iran and Iraq tip missiles with a nuclear warhead and unleash nuclear thunderstorms.

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INTRODUCTION

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.

Paul Nitze

Paul Nitze's haunting reference to nuclear Armageddon in NSC-68, penned in 1950 to chart America's precarious first strategic steps into the atomic age, resonates throughout our current National Security Strategy (NSS). Nitze framed his key security recommendations to Harry Truman fifty years ago, stressing the vital importance of the Republic's survival in the face of a nuclear show down with Cold War enemies. This objective endures as the President's most pressing constitutional duty.

Today, even though U.S. interests have perhaps tripled with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, one remains vital -- "protecting the security of our nation -- our people, our territory and our way of life." Bernard Brodie, scholar and Cold War nuclear theorist, observed that "the perennial problem for leaders of a superpower like the U.S. is to determine the outer boundaries of what is truly vital." Brodie's advice requires U.S. leaders to discriminate among the vital of the most vital of interests. And like a mariner's compass, the threats to those interests point to devising ways (strategies) to use available and appropriate means (instruments of policy) to achieve realistic ends (national interests and objectives). Ultimately, only our enemy's nuclear

arsenal can challenge and intimidate America's truly vital interest - survival and vitality of the nation.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD's), particularly nuclear weapons, targeted at U.S. population centers could break the back of our nation. An all-out Russian ballistic missile attack could devastate our country in thirty minutes. American cities are extremely vulnerable to nuclear terrorism, and could suffer unimagined devastation from an asymmetric attack - for example, stolen warheads detonated during rush hour. We are not immune from the specter of nuclear attack on American soil.

Occasionally, we need to be reminded of that sobering truth.

On the opposite end of the spectrum from nuclear terrorism,

Harold K. Brown, former Secretary of Defense to President Jimmy

Carter, described for him how a nuclear war with the Soviet Union would end:

The destruction of more than 100 million people in each of the U.S., the USSR, and European nations could take place during the first half-hour of a nuclear war. These deaths would be caused by the blast and heat of the fireballs — and the ensuing fires and collapse of buildings. Many tens of millions of additional casualties would be created thereafter by nuclear fallout. Such a war would be a catastrophe not only indescribable, but unimaginable. It would be unlike anything that has taken place on this planet since human life began.³

Fortunately, Presidents in the nuclear age have understood the terrible cost of nuclear weapons enough to balance deterrence with prudent diplomacy and arms control, reducing U.S. overall

dependence on nuclear weapons as a way of furthering U.S. security interests.

Nine Presidents since Truman have carefully forged a credible alloy of policies shaped to slow, and eventually stop, global proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons. Achieving long-term security requires a plan, a strategy. But by no means is our patchwork policy of nonproliferation an ideal strategy. We must realize it is the best we can do, given the difficulty of keeping the lid on a boiling pot of nations clamoring for protection from nuclear weapons while rogue nations buy whatever nuclear goods and services proliferators will sell them.

Why do some international rogue states seek nuclear weapons? How can the U.S. contain proliferation? And finally, can the U.S. blend ends, ways, and means into a coherent strategy of nuclear nonproliferation? This paper will explore these questions and examine our strategy to survive as a nation into the next century.

TODAY'S LANDSCAPE: INTERESTS, POWER, and NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Sustained U.S. power is central to the future of freedom, democracy, free-market economics, and international order in the world. America's power - its superpower status - is interest gained on strategic principal invested during the Cold War.

Nuclear weapons have been the strategic insurance on the note.

Ten years after the Soviet implosion, nuclear weapons are no longer the only weapon-of-choice for great powers. The true silver bullet is a state's ability to generate wealth. States pursue interests and gain power vis-a-vis democratic forms of government, civil society, free-markets, information-based business, and conventional military prowess. This shift to democratization is replacing rusting Cold War strategies of mistrust and missiles as the final arbiter. International economic muscle tone sculpts nation-state interests and relations. As a result, the world today is largely free of nuclear nations unguided by democracy. Aside from permanent UN Security Council members, only India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapon states. We await an announcement from Israel.

Meanwhile, nuclear weapons have faded from Cold War acceptance to more blunt-like instruments of raw national power and coercion, viscerally tagged weapons of aggression, terror and intimidation. A sort of international thermocline in state-to-state relations has evolved. States bent on nuclear proliferation face ostracism, sanctions, and isolation from the international community. Shunned, the current lineup of rogue nations such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea up the ante and operate along the fringes of international mores. These regional hegemons orchestrate nettlesome programs designed to acquire nuclear technology, intent on building small, lethal caches of nuclear weapons; all aimed to gain regional dominance, reduce

U.S. influence and interests, and coerce neighboring states.

Danger of proliferation is highest in traditional regional fault zones of conflict: Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. States seek nuclear weapons when in close proximity to enemies who may possess nuclear weapons (India/Pakistan). National power, prestige, and independence associated with nuclear weapons may be important to emerging powers (India/Israel). Perceived vital interests of state survival may be at stake (North Korea/Israel). Regional military dominance and alliances can cause a great deal of proliferation by many nations (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and China). Hard currency also plays an important profit—taking role in proliferation. Russia, China and North Korea are known exporters of nuclear technology and missiles, earning huge profits to bankroll continued development and production of nuclear and conventional forces.

Most troublesome though is lack of development of sophisticated nuclear doctrine, command and control, and early warning by many emerging nuclear states that great powers deftly integrate into their nuclear structure. In times of crisis government leaders may be faced with speculations, assumptions, and unverifiable intelligence reports to make launch decisions.

It then can be argued nuclear weapons alter the entire relationship of great and small powers. Power, the currency of geopolitical relations, can be brokered and bought with nuclear

weapons. Our own superpower status was bought fifty years ago with the concept of critical mass one thousand feet above Hiroshima.

America's 20th Century power morphed when the shock wave, blast, and a dark mushroom cloud whisped high above Hiroshima.

U.S. bombers carried out the tandem destruction of Hiroshima (4 square miles) and Nagasaki (10 square miles), with atomic bombs to end World War II. The decision was clear and coldly calculated. Briefed on the Manhattan Project in April 1945 only after President Roosevelt's untimely death, Harry Truman approved the final production and employment of the atomic bomb to pulverize Japan cities labeled as military targets. He recalled in his memoirs that he "regarded the atomic bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used." 6

Conversely, Nakita Khrushchev, Soviet icon of the 1950's, shuddered "when first appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee and learned all the facts about Soviet nuclear power. I couldn't sleep for several days. Then I became convinced that we could never possibly use these weapons, and when I realized that I was able to sleep again."

Arguably, nuclear weapons are the major reason why the second half of this century has not witnessed the massive devastation of the World Wars from 1914-45. That assumes nuclear weapons continue to remain in the right hands and the U.S. remains committed to countering proliferation. Nuclear weapons

in the hands of rouge states could fan the flames of regional conflict. Strong proliferation policies with the means to see them through can maintain the status quo and work to slow and eventually reverse proliferation in regional hot spots.

Nuclear weapon deterrence does not guarantee peace, but short of nuclear war, places a limit on the violence. The immense power of nuclear weapons removed long ago any rational basis for a potential adversary to believe a major war could be fought and won. Nuclear weapons appear to have ended the terrible era of ever-more-devastating war. However, the threat of regional conflict must continue to create world efforts to curb proliferation. Our nonproliferation measures must not only treat the symptoms but the cause as well.

U.S. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

American nuclear nonproliferation policy is liberally laced throughout the President's security strategy. A U.S. low-end, prevention based tri-policy of diplomacy, arms-control, and deterrence, underscores U.S. efforts to counter the growing danger of nuclear weapon proliferation:

In effect we will continue pursuing diplomatic, economic, military, arms control, and nonproliferation efforts that promote stability and reduce the danger of WMD's and conventional conflict...WMD'S pose the greatest potential threat to global security...we must continue to reduce the threat...stop proliferation...control outlaw states...aim to discourage arms races...halt proliferation of WMD's and reduce tensions in three key nonproliferation zones: North Korea, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia...we aim to prevent the theft or

diversion of WMD's or related material or technology...we seek a world where the spread of WMD's is minimized, and the international community is willing and able to prevent or respond to calamitous events.

Our bundled nonproliferation "policies within a policy" are complex and hinge on an intergovernmental process that blends military deterrence, diplomacy, treaties, congressional mandates, surety, intelligence, and verification into a coherent strategy. There is no single "point-man" on nonproliferation policy. Department of Defense, Department of State, CIA, Department of Energy, Department of Commerce, the National Security Council and Congress all cut the pie of dollars and responsibilities into many slices. Additionally, six Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's 8, 11, 13, 30, 41, 60) and Executive Order 12938 all address nuclear nonproliferation in some manner. All highly classified, the PDD's clarify policies presented in the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. In essence our nuclear nonproliferation policy counters both direct (symmetric and asymmetric nuclear attack) and indirect (acquiring materials for nuclear weapons) nuclear threats.

"There is no single defense against this threat...America's military superiority cannot shield us completely from the threat of WMD's."¹⁰ So says Secretary of Defense William Cohen in a recent Department of Defense report on countering threat proliferation. "Instead [nuclear weapon proliferation] must be treated like a chronic disease...monitor the symptoms and be ready to respond with a myriad of treatments."¹¹ So, for five decades

we've watched great powers, rogue nations, and terrorist organizations attempt to or acquire, build and stockpile nuclear weapons. This is so partly in response to U.S. efforts to build a superabundant strategic force rivaled only by one former Cold War enemy. The U.S. has countered with strategies to parry the proliferation of fissile material, ballistic and cruise missile technology, reactors and fissile processing plants, and crafted effective arms control regimes and treaties.

In fact our country spends more then one billion dollars annually to combat and monitor strategic weapons proliferation. 12 But that pales in comparison to the 25 billion the U.S. spends annually to maintain a powerful triad of American nuclear forces built to strike first and fast (if we choose to), deter global or regional attack, and counter nuclear reprisal or coercion. U.S. strategic nuclear forces are sufficient to destroy the sources of an enemy's economic, political, and military power. START I nuclear forces mandated by Congress consist of 18 Trident nuclear submarines each tipped with 24 Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MIRV'd) warheads, 50 Peacekeeper MIRV'd missiles, 500 Minuteman III missiles, 71 B52H bombers, 21 B2 bombers, and close to 6,000 warheads atop missiles or stockpiled for bombers. 13 Gone today are nuclear weapons and forces forward deployed: Pershing missiles in Europe, bombers aloft droning hours from "failsafe", or tactical ship-borne nuclear weapons.

Nuclear forces remain important as a hedge against WMD proliferation. "The U.S. must retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any hostile [power] with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests and convince such powers that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile." The existence and continued role of U.S. strategic forces can at times, however, seem trapped in a "house-of-mirrors":

In any nuclear war between major powers, there is too great a possibility of unprecedented, virtually terminal, devastation to civilization. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons are the only credible way to ameliorate that risk by minimizing the possibility of war between great powers. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is the ultimate safeguard against the failure of cooperative diplomacy. ¹⁵

The logic of our arsenal then remains central to our security.

We must continue to possess nuclear weapons as a component of global leadership and primacy of power. Nuclear weapons protect our vital interests through deterrence. The number of nuclear powers and the size of their arsenals must remain small. The U.S. should contain unpredictable powers such as Russia, China, and India. And the U.S. must promote regional stability and prevent regional hegemons from building nuclear forces and instigating regional conflict - the "twin brothers of danger." Samuel Huntington's theory on proliferation of nuclear weapons is a harbinger of the danger the U.S. faces in the future:

A Confucian and Islamic coalition is evolving to challenge the hegemonic domination by the west after its twin victories in the Cold and Gulf Wars. That coalition is seen as intent on increasing its military capacity by importing western military technology,

developing indigenous arms industries, and acquiring NBC weapons to counter conventional technology and superiority. A new arms race has now begun in which Islamic and Confucian coalition is building its arsenal while the west is focused on arms reduction. 16

If deterrence is a blacksmith's blunt hammer, diplomacy, in terms of treaties, arms control regimes, and export technology controls, is the anvil over which we shape much of the United States' efforts to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation.

Treaties and nonproliferation regimes work at cementing global nuclear responsibility and accountability. Diplomatic initiatives enhance regional stability, stem proliferation of WMD's, persuade for restraint, and demand conformity to international standards of conduct. Nations currently subscribe, with rare exception, to the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognizes the five nuclear nations (U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia), demands nuclear celibacy from the others, and prohibits testing. The NPT's first term of force was successful enough that in 1995 it was extended indefinitely without conditions.

Relatively new to world review and approval is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which outlaws all nuclear testing and ends development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. Signed by the U.S. in September 1996, the Senate, unfortunately, has yet to ratify the CTBT. This has created angst with friends and allies, encourages continued proliferation by outlaw states, and allows India and Pakistan to continue

underground testing with impunity despite overwhelming international condemnation. Additional international norms to limit the spread of weapons and technologies include The Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional and Dual use Goods and Technologies of 1996. The agreement obligates the U.S. and thirty-two other governments to strict export controls on dual use materials that could be used to build WMD's.

START II (nuclear warhead reduction treaty) ratification by Russia's DUMA will further reduce U.S/Russian stockpiles and START III negotiations should be able to begin soon. Another U.S. nonproliferation initiative aimed at reducing and safeguarding Russian stockpiles, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), better known as "Nunn-Lugar Program," has contributed significantly to the reduction of proliferation over the past four years. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CTR Program has assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan dismantle and demilitarize all 3400 nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. 17 In addition, CTR program initiatives find jobs for former Soviet weapons scientists, secure tons of fissile materials, convert WMD facilities to commercial enterprises, and establish surety systems for Russian fissile material and warheads. Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.), recently called for sharply increasing the funding for Nunn-Lugar, based on a costbenefit calculus that has given the U.S. great returns in increased security for the hundred-millions spent on CTR. 18

The most recent example of directed nonproliferation diplomacy was the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. North Korea agreed to halt production of plutonium in exchange for monetary credits, advisory support, and technology to build light water reactors — making it more difficult to harvest weaponsgrade plutonium. Although we've witnessed recent North Korean foot dragging, the U.S. has temporarily slowed their efforts to build any quantitative or qualitative difference in North Korean nuclear weapons over the next ten years.

Clearly, obtaining nuclear fissile materials is the most difficult obstacle for many would-be proliferators to acquire. President Clinton in his first address to the United Nations on 27 September 1993 addressed this key component of a comprehensive approach to the problem of reducing worldwide production of fissile materials. The President claimed prohibiting the weapon itself was not enough, as the NPT treaty does, but also with the production of fissile material. In his address President Clinton stated that the U.S. would:

- Seek to eliminate the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
- Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
- Encourage more restrictive arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk.
- Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the IAEA.

"Diplomacy is our first line of defense against threats to national and international security."²⁰ The aggregate of our . nonproliferation diplomatic efforts provides the U.S. leverage to control the nuclear "haves and have-nots." With nuclear proliferation regimes we can essentially "draw a line in the sand" which nations know they (theoretically) can not cross.

Back it up with the threat of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation and the U.S. can exert that leverage on nations greedy to get nuclear materials.

An excellent example is U.S. policy regarding Iraq's WMD program. Since 1991, the U.S., largely through the UN Security Council, has choked off Iraq's WMD program by implementing tough economic sanctions, linked to verification that the program is stone cold dead. Sanctions, no-fly zones, and maritime interception operations all squeezed Iraq, but have so far not delivered the coups-de-grace. So, in December 1998, the U.S. thrashed Iraq with punitive air and cruise missile strikes to scotch continued Iraqi efforts to evade weapons inspections. Coupled to cruise missile "diplomacy" is the recent Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), passed into law by Congress a month prior to the limited strike. The ILA provides President Clinton with political and monetary support to the tune of 100 million dollars to support opposition groups and foment the overthrow of Sadam Hussein. In any event, there is now open public support for the

ouster of a rogue world leader determined to rearm his nation with WMD's.

Additionally, Congress recently passed a series of Arms Export Control Acts levying sanctions against India by cutting humanitarian aid, barring exports of defense materials, and halting U.S. credits and loan guarantees. 21 Despite the sanctions, India detonated multiple underground nuclear weapons in May 1998 in a "saber-rattling" display. Tough-nosed diplomacy failed to convince the Indians to hold off, exposing weaknesses inherent in our nonproliferation policies. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger believes the recent India -- Pakistan testing is a "pattern of lost influence and the U.S.'s inability to persuade other countries that they should not test, proliferate, or acquire nuclear weapons...because other countries feel the U.S. no longer has the capability or the will to carry out a firm and unambiguous foreign policy, supported by a strong and highly effective military...our ability to deter has decreased."22 Mr. Weinberger's indictment calls into question the sine qua non of American nonproliferation policy -- can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons with our traditional one-two preventative punch of deterrence and diplomacy?

The changing post-Cold War environment and our new found conventional superiority could cause a new wave of proliferation -- a paradox of sorts. It has become infeasible for hostile states to counter the U.S. in conventional combat. Conceivably,

our superiority drives regional hegemons to nuclear weapons because the U.S. threatens them conventionally. These outlaw nations in turn look to Cold War superpower logic of possessing nuclear weapons to deter U.S. regional influence. Interestingly enough, when the Indian military chief was asked what he thought of the lessons of the U.S. gulf war, he reportedly replied, "Never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons." Ominous in tone but seemingly on the mark, the U.S. has become disinterested in nuclear weapons for its own strategic purposes. "What we're really interested in is how to keep adversaries from using WMD's as a means to counter U.S. conventional power, and how to protect U.S. forces abroad from WMD attacks."²⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS - THE BEST WE CAN DO

Herman Kahn, noted theorist and expert on U.S. nuclear weapons policy believes U.S. nuclear weapons policy should not be targeted solely to decrease the number of weapons in the world, but to make the world safer given nuclear weapons are here to stay. Kahn argues there will never be total disarmament. In fact, danger from proliferation continues to expand at rates greater then preventive measures can slow proliferation: technology transfer, fissile material transfer, weapon delivery transfer (cruise and ballistic missiles), sporadic underground testing, and rogue nation research and development all march on, posing real threats to U.S. vital interests. Additionally, tens

of thousands of nuclear warheads remain in bunkers, concrete silos, and launch tubes on ballistic missile armed submarines around the globe. The mind-boggling numbers of warheads make our own triad seem somehow surreal, thousands of warheads, all leftovers, from past policies of Massive Retaliation, Graduated Response, and Flexible Deterrence. Are we living a paradox - demanding stringent nonproliferation measures from others while hoarding our own mega-arsenal of warheads?

Frankly, even if all nuclear weapons were banned, not all would be destroyed. It would be unacceptable to have a disarmament solution that allowed those with hidden weapons or fissile materials to gain an extraordinary advantage over the rest of the world. Given the permanence of nuclear weapons, U.S. efforts to promote international nonproliferation must continue to progress along many axes: arms control, diplomacy, treaty and regime building, and deterrence, designed to buttress our vital interests.

Arms control agreements in the years ahead must continue the process of reducing numbers and types of weapons and delivery systems. It is in the U.S. interest to get beyond START II and III agreements with the Russians and begin serious multilateral talks with permanent Security Council members to galvanize real discussion on warhead reduction. China must be brought into future nuclear arms control negotiations. All the great powers can afford to reduce stockpiles yet remain secure. As in the

game of chess, in taking pieces off the board - what is important is not what your remove from the board but what remains on the board.

Diplomacy must continue to yield further successes.

Underpinning any future diplomatic progress in nonproliferation must be real efforts to resolve regional disputes in the Persian Gulf, the Koreas, and saber rattling between India and Pakistan. Regional wars remain a surefire way to spark nuclear confrontation. U.S. military strategy accounts for this fact. All our key war-plans are designed to counter outbreaks of warfighting in the most volatile regions, where U.S. interests rub with rogue states busy shaping nuclear capabilities.

Beyond regional peace issues, the U.S. must facilitate and complete the CTBT ratification process of the next few years. Post-CTBT, treaties and regimes should eventually ban all production of weapons grade plutonium, and refocus nations on their NPT, Article VI responsibility, committing all parties to pursue negotiations to end nuclear the arms-race and achieve nuclear disarmament. Idealism in small doses soothes international pessimism.

Neither will the need for deterrence disappear anytime soon. There are still powerful nations in the world, which are potential adversaries now and in the future. Nuclear deterrence remains the surest way to inhibit states from engaging in strategic conflict with the United States. Deterrence must be

robust and credible. Credible deterrence creates extreme caution in the behavior of other states if they wish to threaten vital U.S. security interests. The danger is real and persists: U.S. missile exchange with Russia, regional nuclear duels, coercion by irresponsible nuclear rogues, terrorism, or accidental detonations all threaten U.S. vitality. U.S. nuclear destructive power hedges these threats and provides great power and influence. "Possession creates a threshold of antagonism no nation can cross."²⁶

Looming implosion and questionable security of the Russian nuclear arsenal still demand a robust American deterrence.

Cooperative Threat Reduction programs must receive continued support and resourcing. Our efforts to buy off North Korean nuclear adventurism must continue. American cruise missile proxy war against Iraq's WMD program has gone far to check potential hegemony in the Middle East. Deterrence is a skill perfected by decades of protracted struggle against Cold War enemies. It must remain an arrow in our quiver of nonproliferation strategies.

Now the hard choice: given the continued danger posed by legitimate and illegitimate nuclear powers, should we stay the course with current nonproliferation policies, or soften our deterrence, putting parts of our nuclear triad "on ice," and back off conventionally in key strategic fault zones -- North Korea, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia? Retired Admiral Stansfield Turner believes we can escrow large portions of our nuclear force

and publicly denounce first use of nuclear weapons to relieve regional pressures, and still maintain our vital interests. Instead, the U.S. could rely heavily on conventional countervalue to both deter and bolster our diplomatic initiatives. 27 The U.S. could boldly declare we are nuclear but not Neanderthal. Should the U.S. be willing to take great national risk in the next century to prove it can champion a nuclear free world? Should America scrap nuclear deterrence, "ice it down," and open a serious dialogue on the need for nuclear weapons? General Leslie Groves, father of the Manhattan Project, once remarked at the height of the Cold War, "If Russia knows we won't attack first, the Kremlin will be very much less apt to attack us...Our reluctance to strike first is a military disadvantage to us; but is also, paradoxically, a factor in preventing a world conflict today." 28 It is no doubt wise for the U.S. to stay the course with an indirect approach to nonproliferation - treaties, diplomacy, surety, verification, and international dialogue. U.S. leaders may want to reevaluate the nuclear deterrence options of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation strategies. Are we deterring a Cold War ghost or a real menace to our vital interests?

CONCLUSION

Countries determined to maintain nuclear weapons programs over the long term have been placing significant emphasis on securing their programs against U.S. interdiction and disruption. Our nonproliferation efforts out to 2010 must address current and future forms of deterring nuclear attack on U.S. soil. Yes, we should expect continued flexing of new found nuclear muscle. But can we actually deter a nuclear attack on the U.S. by reserving first use or escalating in response to an unprovoked attack against our country? The answer is elusive and hotly debated. Does President Clinton want to be the last U.S. President to unleash a nuclear attack? Our triad will not rust for a very long time - it will be available if the U.S. really needs it. Finally, there is a step beyond deterrence. "Deterrence after all depends on a subjective feeling which we are trying to create in the opponent's mind, a feeling compounded of respect and fear, and we have to ask ourselves whether it is not possible to overshoot the mark."29

Dare we be bold and renounce first use of nuclear weapons, begin serious reductions of nuclear warheads aimed at other populations, and stand down front line nuclear forces. Global security must evolve in our lifetime. Eventually, the United States must reach for global freedom, freedom from nuclear nightmares.

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